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ABSTRACT
The growth in the computer forensic field has created a demand for new software
(or increased functionality to existing software) and a means to verify that this
software is truly forensic i.e. capable of meeting the requirements of the trier of
fact. In this work, we review our previous work---a function oriented testing
framework for validation and verification of computer forensic tools. This
framework consists of three parts: function mapping, requirements specification
and reference set development. Through function mapping, we give a scientific
and systemized description of the fundamentals of computer forensic discipline,
i.e. what functions are needed in the computer forensic investigation process. We
focus this paper on the functions of media preparation, write protection and
verification. Specifically, we complete the function mapping of these functions
and specify their requirements. Based on this work, future work can be conducted
to develop corresponding reference sets to test any tools that possess these
functions.
Keywords: Computer forensics, validation, media preparation, write protection,
verification
1. INTRODUCTION
Defined by Rodney (Rodney 1999), computer forensics is the process of
identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting digital evidence in a manner that
is legally acceptable. In this work, we use the terms Electronic Evidence (EE),
computer forensics, digital forensics and forensic computing to refer to this
discipline.
There is a critical need in the law enforcement community to ensure the reliability
of computer forensic tools, which means forensic software tools consistently
produce accurate and objective results. Hence, a demand of validating and
verifying these tools has been raised recently (Jason 2007). Generally, the
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validation and verification (VV) of softwares often refers to methods and
technologies that provide confidence in system softwares. Since introduced in the
early 1990s, the concept of validation and verification has been interpreted in a
number of contexts by different organizations and communities, such as IEEE
standard 1012-1998, ISO 17025 and the Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence (SWGDE). Taking into consideration all these definitions and keeping
in mind the requirements of ISO 17025 (e.g. validation is the confirmation by
examination and the provision of objective evidence that the particular
requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled), we adopt the definitions of
validation and verification of forensic tools proposed by Jason (Jason 2007).


Validation is the confirmation by examination and the provision of
objective evidence that a tool, technique or procedure functions
correctly and as intended.



Verification is the confirmation of a validation with a laboratories
tools, techniques and procedures.

Two approaches, i.e. software inspection and software testing are widely used in
the field of software validation and verification. While the former takes place at
all stages of software development life-cycle, inspecting requirements documents,
design diagrams and program codes, the latter runs an implementation of the
target software to check if the software is produced correctly or as intended. Since
our proposed work is to validate existing EE software tools, it falls into the
software testing category.
EE software tool validation and verification is still in its embryonic stage, and
there is limited work in this filed, such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) project “Computer Forensics Tool Testing” (CFTT) (NIST
2009) and Brian Carrier’s work Digital Forensics Tool Testing (DFTT) Images
(Brian 2009).
In our previous work (Jason 2007), we proposed a function orientated framework
for EE tool validation and verification. The core principle of our framework is
function driving, and this framework conceptually consists of three parts: function
mapping, requirement specification and reference set development. In this
framework, we identify fundamental functions required in EE investigations, such
as search, data recovery, forensic copy and so on. For each function, we further
identify its details, e.g. sub-categories, components and etc. We call this process
function mapping. Based on the function mapping, we specify each function's
requirements and then develop a reference set against which EE tools can be
tested. Following this work, we focused on and addressed two functions, i.e.
“search” and “data recovery” in (Guo 2009) and (Guo 2010) respectively. For
each function, we accomplished its function mapping, requirements specification
and reference set development. In this work, we continue our “puzzle game” and
focus on the functions of “media preparation”, “write protection” and “(forensic

6

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(2)
copy) verification”. The related background information of our VV framework
and detailed review of existing work of EE software tool validation and
verification can be found in (Guo 2009). By addressing EE functions one by one,
we eventually can accomplish the entire function oriented validation and
verification of EE tools in the end.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review our function
orientated VV framework. Section 3, 4, 5 address the functions of “media
preparation”, “write protection” and “verification” respectively, in terms of
function mapping, requirements specification and reference development.
Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. FUNCTION ORIENTED VV FAMEWORK
In this section, we review our proposed validation and verification paradigm. Our
methodology starts with a scientific and systemized description of the EE field
through a model and the function mapping. Components and processes of the EE
discipline are defined in this model and fundamental functions in EE investigation
process are specified (mapped), i.e. search, data recovery, file identification and
etc. Based on the comprehensive and clear understanding of EE discipline, we
then actually perform the validation and verification of EE tools as follows. First,
for each mapped function, we specify its requirements. Then, we develop a
reference set in which each test case (or scenario) is designed corresponding to
one function requirement. With the reference set, an EE tool or its functions can
be validated and verified independently.
In this work, we use the CFSAP (computer forensic-secure, analyze, present)
model (George 2003) to describe the basic procedures of EE investigation. In this
model, four fundamental procedures are identified: Identification, preservation,
analysis and presentation. In the context of validation and verification,
identification and presentation are skill based concepts, while preservation and
analysis are predominately process, function and tool driven concepts and are
therefore subject to tool validation and verification. The processes of preservation
and analysis are preliminarily dissected into several fundamental functions at the
high-level. The functions in the data preservation procedure are forensic copy,
verification, write protection and media preparation. The data analysis procedure
involves eight functions: searching, file rendering, data recovery, decryption, file
identification, processing, temporal data and process automation. An ontology of
such function mapping is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1 A top-level ontology of computer forensic functions
Our function orientated VV methodology can be presented as the following. If the
domain of computer forensic functions is known and the domain of expected
results (i.e. requirements of each function) are known; that is, the range and
specification of the results, then the process of validating any tool can be as
simple as providing a set of references with known results. When a tool is tested,
a set of metrics can also be derived to determine the fundamental scientific
measurements of accuracy and precision. In summary, if the discipline can be
mapped in terms of functions (and their specifications) and, for each function, the
expected results are identified and mapped as a reference set, then any tool,
regardless of its original design intention, can be validated against known
elements.
3. MEDIA PREPARATION FUNCTION
Images, results of “forensic copy” process, must be accommodated in storage
devices for future analysis. Three types of storage devices, i.e. magnetic disks
(hard drives), optical disks (CD, DVD) and semiconductor devices (flash
memory) are widely available on the market. These devices used by EE
investigators for storing images could be either brand new or reused from one
investigation to the next. In both cases, especially the latter one, an investigator
needs to ensure the device is “clean”, that is the device does not contain any data
that could inadvertently become included in the current investigation. We, in this
work, call the process of initiating storage devices forensically clean as
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sanitisation. Although using the same name, we realize that the concept of
sanitisation in the computer forensic context has slight differences from that in
data security context. We will detail these differences in this section. After being
sanitized, storage devices may need to be further processed (e.g. a hard disk may
be partitioned and formatted). Hence, from the function point of view, we further
dissect the function media preparation into three subcategories: sanitisation,
partitioning and formatting as shown in Figure 2.

Fig. 2 Media preparation function mapping
3.1 Function mapping
Originally, the concept of sanitisation, or storage media sanitisation, stemmed
from data security. In today’s digital computing world, all digital data is
maintained in storage devices, such as hard disk, CD, DVD and flash memory.
When the owners retire their storage devices without proper data treatment, they
will risk the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information contained in the
disposed storage devices. To prevent it from happening, one method is used, that
is storage media sanitisation. According to (Kissel 2006), sanitisation is referred
to as “the general process of removing data from storage media, such that there is
reasonable assurance, in proportion to the confidentiality of the data, that the data
may not be retrieved and reconstructed”. Four basic sanitization security levels
and corresponding techniques are defined in (Hughes 2009): weak erase (deleting
files), block erase (overwrite by external software), normal secure erase (current
drives), and enhanced secure erase.
In the forensic computing context, sanitisation is generally referred to as the
method to make storage device prepared for use/reuse in a forensically sound
manner. Due to the difference of sanitisation in forensic computing and data
security in terms of sanitisation purpose, not all techniques of data security
sanitisation are applicable to the sanitisation in the forensic computing context.
For example, deleting file and reformatting can be used as sanitisation techniques
with certain security level in data security context. However, they are not
forensically sound technique of sanitisation in the forensic computing context.
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This is because deleting a file merely removes its name from the directory
structure’s special disk sectors. The user data remains in the drive data storage
sectors and could be included to the next investigation. Reformatting a hard disk
drive clears the file directory and severs the links between storage sectors, but the
user data still remains. Therefore, overwriting, i.e. intentionally overlay the
original data with arbitrary or random data, becomes the most secure technique
for forensic computing sanitisation.
There are several factors investigators need to take into account when they
perform the overwriting sanitisation, such as overwrite pattern, overwrite methods
(Figure 3) and overwrite target (Figure 4). First, overwriting could be executed at
either physical level or application level. By “physical level”, we mean the
overwriting is performed through using the built-in commands of a hard drive. A
digital storage device may be attached to a host computer by one of several
interfaces, such as ATA (AT Attachment), SATA (Serial ATA), SCSI (Small
Computer System Interface), USB (Universal Serial Bus), and FireWire. For
ATA and SATA hard drives, the SECURITY ERASE UNIT command
overwrites a hard drive. This command instructs the drive’s on-board controller to
run a firmware routine that overwrites disk contents at the physical level,
including any remapped bad sectors containing old data. The command is also
supposed to move the drive head off track by 10% so that data between tracks is
also overwritten. A similar command, ERASE, is defined for the SCSI interface.
Besides these built-in facilities, there is a wide range of softwares and applications
can implement the overwriting sanitisation as well. A survey of free and
commercially available sanitisation tools can be found in (Garfinkel 2003,
Roubos 2007).
Secondly and third, investigators need to select what to write (overwrite
materials) to overlay original data (overwrite target). The selection of overwrite
materials is the second difference of sanitisation in data security and forensic
computing. In the data security context where the purpose of sanitisation is to
overlay original data, the overwrite materials may take various forms of binary
zeros, fixed data pattern or random data. However, the most overwrite material
used for sanitisation in forensic computing is binary Zeros because it is required
that there shall no possibility of inadvertent inclusion of unrelated data from a
storage device into an investigation.
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Fig. 3 Overwrite pattern and method mapping
At last, there is debate on the level of sanitisation that should take place, with the
historical perspective that any wiping should consist of a DOD wipe (3 writes).
The reason behind this has been justified by the release of a number of papers
detailing recovery of remanent data. (Gutmann, 1996). Although it is a
controversial endeavour, Wright claims a single write is substantial enough to
remove data (Wright, 2008).

Fig. 4 Overwrite Target
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Digital data contained in modern storage devices falls in one of the following
categories: operating system, application programs, and user data stored in files.
Drives also contain backing store for virtual memory, and operating system metainformation, such as directories, file attributes, and allocation tables. There is a
range of places in storage devices where data could reside. For example, in hard
disks, the allocated space is where data normally resides. Besides, the ambient
space (i.e. unallocated space, or space orphaned from the operating or file system)
may also contain remnants of previous files that were deleted but not completely
overwritten, bytes at the end of partially filled directory blocks (sometimes called
slack space), startup software that is not strictly part of the operating system (such
as boot blocks), and virgin blocks that were initialized at the factory but never
written. Hence, the ambient space may take the form of file slack, volume slack,
HPA (Host Protected Area), DCO(Device Configuration Overlay) and so on. In
order to obtain a completely “clean” storage device, all above space need to be
overwritten.
Apart from sanitisation, partitioning and formatting may be needed to get storage
devices prepared for accommodating digital evidence or images in some
circumstances. The specification of partition and formatting, such as how many
partitions in a hard disk, which file system is specified for each partition, is
predominately depending on investigation.
3.2 Requirement Specification
Requirement specification is the second step of validating and verifying functions.
Similar to our previous work, we specify requirements of the write preparation
function in an extendable and custom-made way. From function mapping, we can
see that there are a variety of diversifications we need to take into consideration
when we specify the requirements. For example, the overwrite materials could be
all binary zeros, fixed data pattern or random data. The overwrite target could be
data in allocated space, ambient space or metadata. Hence, we use variables (in
boldfaced and italic) to reflect these diversifications, and hence multifarious
requirements can be refined to the follows statements. When one requirement
needs change, people just need tailor (add, deleted, or modify) these variables.
1. The tool shall be able to overwrite overwrite target by overwrite
means using overwrite pattern.
2. The tool shall verify the success execution of overwriting
3. If the tool is not able to overwrite certain area in storage devices (e.g.
defective sectors), the tool shall inform the user
4. If the tool support partition function, then the tool shall partition the
storage device
5. If the tool support formatting function, then the tool shall format the
storage device
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This method of requirements specification is highly abstract and generalized.
When it is needed for developing a specific test scenario in reference set, each of
these requirements can be unwrapped. For example, the requirement “The tool
shall be able to overwrite overwrite target by overwrite means using overwrite
pattern” can be unwrapped and instantiated as “The tool shall be able to overwrite
data in file slack space by single writing 0s through ATA SECURITY ERASE
UNIT command” or “The tool shall be able to overwrite data in allocated space
by multiple writing random data through ATA SECURITY ERASE UNIT
command " and etc.
4. WRITE PROTECTION FUNCTION
One of the forensic computing investigation rules identified by Rodney (Rodney
1999) is “application of forensic computer processes during the examination of
original data shall be kept to an absolute minimum”. In other words, during an
investigation (e.g. acquisition or analysis), digital evidence stored in active system
or a secondary storage device must be protected from being overwritten or
altered. In modern computer systems, data is written to or read from a storage
device via commands that are issued by the computer and transmitted from the
computer's interface connection to the storage device's interface connection.
Hence, the basic strategy for implementing a write protection is to place a filter
between a host computer and a secondary storage device. This filter monitors I/O
commands issued by the application. It blocks all commands that could directly or
potentially cause alteration to the original data, and only allows commands to the
device that make no changes to the device.
The filter sitting in the connection between a host computer and a storage device
could be implemented either as hardware or software. Accordingly, two types of
write protection techniques are developed, that are hardware write protection
(blocking) and software write protection (blocking). Additionally, there is a third
type of write protection that can be argued. It involves the practitioner adopting
procedures and practices that reduce or eliminate un-intentional changes to data.
In the following (as shown by Figure 5), we extrapolate these broad write
protection functions further, detailing their constituent components.
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Fig. 5 Write Protection function mapping
4.1 Function mapping
4.1.1 Hardware write blocking
The hardware write blocking is implemented by a physical or mechanical device
(known as hardware write blocker, HWB) that monitors the commands being
issued and prevents the computer from writing data to the storage device. HWB is
physically connected between the computer and a storage device, and hence
breaks the bus used to attach a hard drive to a host computer into two segments.
Once the blocking device is connected it can intercept a command from the host
and select a desired course of action (e.g. allowing or blocking) for the command.
Various storage devices are attached to the host computer through certain physical
interfaces. The common ones are the ATA and IDE (Integrated Drive Electronics)
interfaces, including variants such as ATA-2, ATA-3 and EIDE (Enhanced IDE).
Other physical interfaces include SATA, SCSI, IEEE 1394 and USB. The HWB
intercepts all commands from the host to the storage device and only issues safe
commands to the storage device.
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4.1.2 Software write blocking
Compared to the HWB, the filter that blocks write commands could be also
implemented in software way, that is software write blocker (SWB). Basically,
three approaches are widely used for SWB: Interrupt based blocking, driver based
blocking and OP applications.
Today’s operating systems usually provide higher level access interfaces or
services (compared to low level programming required for direct access drive
through the interface controller) to execute drive related commands. For example,
programs running in the DOS environment can use services: DOS service
interface (Interrupt 0x21) or BIOS service interface (Interrupt 0x13). A SWB
works by modifying interrupt table, which is used to locate the code for a given
BIOS service (Brian 2005). The interrupt table has an entry for every service that
the BIOS provides, and each entry contains the address where the service code
can be found. For example, the entry for INT 13h will point to the code that will
write or read data to or from the disk. A SWB modifies the interrupt table so that
the table entry for interrupt 0x13 contains the address of the write blocker code
instead of the BIOS code. When the operating system calls INT13h, the write
blocker code is executed and examines which function is being requested.
A SWB can also be implemented as a segment code inserted into the device
driver stack in operating systems that manages all access to a device. This code
examines all the commands sent to a device through the stack. Any command that
could directly or potentially cause modification to a protected drive is blocked,
i.e., it is not passed on to lower layers of the stack. The third SWB approach
utilises operating system facilitates to achieve write blocking. For example, in
Windows
XP,
people
can
modify
the
registry
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\StorageDevic
ePolicies to prevent or allow the writing command. In Unix, command (Mountro) is used for the same purpose.
4.1.3 Procedure based write blocking
Apart form HWB and SWB, the third write protection is based on abidance by
certain procedures or rules. It involves the practitioner adopting procedures and
practices that reduce or eliminate un-intentional changes to data. An example
would include a practitioner using a DOS boot disk to access data on a hard disk,
called controlled booting. The disk would boot a known operating system that the
user would use tools known not to alter data.
4.2 Requirement specification
The CFTT project in NIST has covered the requirement specification of write
protection (block) function very well (NIST 2009). They have already done
extensive and comprehensive work on function requirement specification of
hardware write block and software write block. Hence, we adopt their work and
use them as requirement specification for our work. However, one concern could
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be raised. That is, their tests may not be very repeatable for the average laboratory
because it required sourcing a lot of devices, which is unwieldy and costly for
smaller laboratories or even larger laboratories.
5. VERIFICATION FUNCTION
5.1 Function mapping
In the preservation phase of EE investigation, after forensic copy (Guo 2009) is
completed, both the original and the copy of the original must be authenticated.
The meaning of image authentication in computer forensic context is two-fold.
First, it must be demonstrable that the copy is an exact, bona fide, copy of the
original. This is raised by the requirement that any conclusions drawn from
analysis of the copy are valid. The second meaning of image authentication is that
there must be assurance of the continued integrity of the original. The image
authentication is often referred to as (forensic copy) verification.
Forensic copy verification can be implemented on a number of different levels
(Figure 6), and each has its own degree of reliability in their application. The
simplest and lowest reliable verification is the visual inspection. In certain
circumstances, investigators may verify image’s integrity by visually inspecting
and comparing the original data and its copy.
Another verification method is the checksum. It checks for errors in digital data.
Typically a 16- or 32-bit polynomial is applied to each byte of digital data. The
result is a small integer value that is 16 or 32 bits in length and represents the
concatenation of the data. At any point in the future the same polynomial can be
applied to the data and then compared with the original result. If the results match
some level of integrity exists.
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Fig. 6 Forensic copy verification function mapping
The most commonly used verification method is the cryptographic one way hash
function (OWHF). OWHF make use of block cipher algorithms to calculate a
digest (typically a value represented by a 128-bit string or longer) of a file or disk.
This value is sensitive to the change of even a single bit in the original dada. After
or during a forensic copy, acquisition tools will calculate a hash value for later
reference. When verification is needed, investigators calculate the hash value
again, and compare the two hash values. A mismatch indicates the integrity
breach. MD5 and SHA-1 are widely used in OWHF verification method.
The digital signature method can provide the highest degree of reliability. It binds
the identity of the signer with digital data integrity methods (e.g. one-way hash
values). These methods use a public key crypto-system where the signer uses a
secret key to generate a digital signature. Anyone can then validate the signature
generated by using the published public key certificate of the signer. DSA and
RSA are typical examples of this method (Charlie 2002).
Another component of verification function is identified by reviewing what the
digital integrity is. According to Alfred (Alfred 2001), digital integrity can be
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defined as “the property whereby digital data has not been altered in an
unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an
authorized source”. While above verification methods address questions of
“who” (the signer) and “what” (the digital data), they don’t provide the answer to
the question of “when”. Specifically, when did the signing of the digital evidence
occur? How long after the evidence was seized, was its integrity protected? How
long can we prove the integrity of the digital evidence that we signed? A secure
and auditable time stamping mechanism or function is a solution to these
questions (Hosmer 2002). When the forensic copy is done, a time stamp that is
resistant to manipulation and provides an authenticated audit trail is created. It
then can be electronically “bind” to digital evidence so that they can be verified
by a third party. A number of issues need to be considered in time stamping, such
as traceability to legal time sources, time distribution, secure digital time stamping
and etc.
5.2 Requirements specification
1. The tool shall accurately perform hash functions and calculate hash
values of verification objects.
2. The tool shall support multiple hash functions.
3. The tool shall support or provide time stamping.
4. The tool shall not mutate the verification objects.
5. The tool shall verify the correctness of hash values
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on and address the validation and verification of functions,
media preparation, write protection and forensic copy verification. Specifically,
we complete their function mapping and specify their requirements. Based on this
work, future work can be conducted to develop corresponding reference sets to
test any tools that possess these functions.
To complete the entire validation paradigm, more work need to be carried out in
the future. First, although the proposed methodology holds promise, we realize
that it needs to be tested at least using one tool in order to evaluate the
methodology and work out any potential weakness or shortcomings. Hence, some
tests will be implemented against some real tools, such as EnCase and FTK.
Secondly, a quantitative model is required to evaluate the results of validation and
verification. For example, specific metrics are needed to measure the accuracy
and precision of testing results. Then, we need to design judgement rules of
validity of EE tools. How to judge if a tool is validated or not? Is a tool validated
only when it passes all the test cases, or is a tool validated in certain scenarios
where it pass these test cases?
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